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Abstract
We analyze the implications of communitarianism the tendency of people to organize into
separate culturally homogeneous groups for individual and group inequality in human capital ac-
cumulation. We propose a non-cooperative social interactions model where each individual decides
how much time to invest in human capital versus ethnic capital, and his utility from investment in
either form of capital is increasing in the investment of his ethnic group in that form of capital.
We nd that, in equilibrium, the demand for human capital is a¤ected positively by individual
and group ability, and negatively by group size. Moreover, two groups that are ex ante identical
in ability distribution may diverge in human capital accumulation, with divergence only occurring
among their low-ability members. The latter always coordinate on the same type of investment,
showing a contagion or herding e¤ect. Furthermore, we nd that ethnic and group fragmentation
increases the demand for human capital. We validate these predictions of the model using household
data from a setting where ethnicity and religion are the primary identity cleavages. We document
persistent ethnic and religious inequality in educational attainment. Members of ethnic groups that
historically converted to Christianity fare better than those whose ancestors converted to Islam.
Consistent with theory, there is little di¤erence between the high-ability members of these groups,
but low-ability members of historically Muslim groups choose Koranic education as an alternative
to formal education. Also, the descendants of ethnic groups that were evenly exposed to both
religions outperform those whose ancestors had contact with only one religion, and local ethnic
fragmentation increases the demand for formal education.
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1 Introduction
Inequality across social groups with distinct identities and cultures is one of the most important
issues facing modern societies. Disparities in economic opportunities, employment, earnings, and
asset holding are generally perceived as symptoms of discrimination against the less well-o¤ groups,
which often leads to social animosities, riots, and violent conicts.1 In a perfectly competitive market
economy, group inequality partly results from group-level di¤erences in the levels of human capital. A
large body of literature has suggested that such di¤erences are in part attributable to cultural factors
(e.g., Ogbu (1978), Fordham and Ogbu (1986), Fordham (1996), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005)), with
some groups adopting an oppositional attitude towards formal education, and others encouraging or
pressuring their members into intensive community activities that leave little time for human capital
acquisition.2 However, the analysis of the individual and group factors that inuence the educational
choice of individuals is still in its infancy. Given the grave social consequences of individual and group
inequality, undertaking such an analysis is important for informing the design of public policy.
In this paper, we analyze the implications of communitarianism, that is, the tendency of people
to organize into culturally homogeneous groups which act as closed networks, for individual and
group inequality in human capital accumulation.3 The set of potential groups arises exogenously, but
adherence to group values is endogenous. Education, through which human capital is built, is promoted
by a secular state as a universal value. Each individual chooses how much time to invest in acquiring
education, and how much to invest in strengthening his relationship with his community. We study
the determinants of such a choice, focusing on the interplay of individual characteristics such as ability
with group characteristics such as group size and ability. From our ndings, we also identify a new
mechanism through which social fragmentation a¤ects human capital demand. We test the theoretical
predictions using nationally representative household data from Nigeria, where ethnicity and religion
are the primary identity cleavages. We document considerable ethnic and religious inequality in
educational attainment, and show that these di¤erences can be traced back to historical religious
conversion during the colonial era. Members of ethnic groups that historically converted to Christianity
fare better than those whose ancestors converted to Islam. Consistent with theory, the descendants of
ethnic groups that were evenly exposed to both religions outperform those whose ancestors had contact
with only one religion, and local ethnic fragmentation increases the demand for formal schooling.
1.1 An Overview of the Model
Our theoretical setup is a non-cooperative social interactions game in which we consider a society
composed of several ethnic groups. Each agent can invest in ethnic capital and/or human capital. By
investing in ethnic capital, we mean that the individual spends time in his ethnic community, either
1See, e.g., Mitra and Ray (2010), Esteban and Ray (2011), and Sen (1973).
2See Section 2 for a comprehensive literature review.
3We note that the word communitarianism has been used in di¤erent contexts. Traditionally, it has been used to
dene a philosophy or ideology that emphasizes the importance of community in individual and political life. We use it
to dene the organization of a society into distinct self-centered communities.
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attending schools run by the community or participating in community-run projects for the betterment
of the group as a whole. By investing in human capital, we mean that the individual spends time in
activities that in the future will lead to higher personal returns for him, in particular, we mean he
attends state-run school.
The benets to the agent from investing in either kind of capital depend on how many people of
his ethnicity also invest in the same kind of capital. For instance, by investing in ethnic capital, an
agent builds stronger ties with those from his ethnic group who also invest in ethnic capital. This
may later help him to nd a livelihood within the ethnic community. On the other hand, the more
an agent invests in human capital, the stronger are his ties to those in his ethnic community who also
invest in human capital, and using those connections, he might land a job in the higher paying formal
or skilled sector. Hence, the higher the community investment in the form of capital in which the
agent is more invested, the higher his utility.4 Naturally, this can be motivated through thinking of
positive network e¤ects. In the absence of these network benets, the individual is better o¤ investing
in human capital, as the formal sector is associated with higher wages than the informal (or unskilled)
sector.
We further assume that each agent is endowed with a certain level of ability that positively a¤ects
his utility. Ability enters the utility function so that for any positive level of human capital investment,
a person with higher ability generates higher utility (this assumption is equivalent to saying that the
acquisition of human capital is less costly to agents with higher ability).
We show that the number of Nash equilibria of this social interactions game is at least one and at
most two, depending on group exogenous characteristics (group size and ability distribution).
1. If a group is small5, then there is a unique equilibrium in which all members invest in human
capital regardless of their ability. This is so because small communities o¤er little "social capital"
benets, hence, each individual is better o¤ trying for a higher wage in the skilled sector regardless of
his ability.
2. If a group is large and rich in ability, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which all members
invest in human capital. In fact, we show that the high-ability members of a group always invest in
human capital. However, low-ability members care more about the size of the network to which they
belong. Therefore, if a group is rich in ability, meaning that the number of high-ability individuals
in the group is large, low-ability members will follow the crowd of these high-ability individuals in
investing in human capital, beacuse if they invest in ethnic capital instead, they will only form a small
network, which does not generate enough social benets.
3. If a group is large and poor in ability, then there exist two equilibria. In one, all members of the
group invest in human capital. In the other, high-ability members invest in human capital whereas
low-ability members invest in ethnic capital. These predictions show that if the number of low-ability
individuals is large, they will all coordinate on the same type of investment to form a large network,
4This assumption reminds the "strategic complementary" assumption well known in the literature (see, e.g., Glaeser
and Scheinkman (2000) on some of its formulations). See also Belhaj and Deroian (2011) for a similar assumption in a
context in which agents allocate time between two activities.
5There exists a threshold such that a group is considered small if its size is below that threshold, and large otherwise.
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therefore either investing in human capital or in ethnic capital.
The ndings stated in (2) and (3) reveal that low-ability individuals simply follow the crowd in
choosing a type of capital, suggesting a contagion or herding e¤ect (Banerjee (1992)). Unlike in
Banerjee (1992), however, herding in our model is driven by the fact that low-ability individuals gain
from associating themselves with others.
Overall, the ndings uncover new important individual- and group-level determinants of human
capital demand in a simple unied framework. They also explain cross-group di¤erences in human
capital accumulation. The key testable predictions implied by these ndings are the following:
T1-1. Two groups that are not necessarily identical will converge in human capital accumulation if
they are su¢ ciently small or if they are su¢ ciently rich in ability, ceteris paribus. In fact, it
follows from (1) and (2) that their members will all invest in human capital.
T1-2. Two large groups that are ex ante identical in size and ability distribution may diverge in
human capital accumulation. Such a divergence, however, would only occur among the low-
ability members of both groups. This prediction follows immediately from (3).
T2. A persons demand for human capital is positively a¤ected by his ability and his groups ability.
This derives from (2).
T3. A persons demand for human capital is negatively a¤ected by his groups size. This comes from
the fact that members of smaller groups invest more in human capital as stated in (1).
T4. Ethnic and group fragmentation positively a¤ects the demand for human capital. In fact, frag-
mentation leads to smaller groups, and members of small groups are more likely to invest in
human capital as stated in (1).
The ndings stated in (T1-1) and (T1-2) have important implications for the empirical analysis
of cross-group di¤erences in human capital accumulation. (T1-1) implies that observed cross-group
di¤erences in this outcome may disappear if we control for some observable individual and group
characteristics. But (T1-2), which derives from the existence of two equilibria in large groups that
are not su¢ ciently rich in ability (3), implies that in a multivariate regression of human capital on
group identity, controlling for all "imaginable" variables related to both factors may not erase group
di¤erences in the outcome. However, as the theory predicts, di¤erences across groups will persist
only among their low-ability members. Such a divergence in human capital may be determined, as
we will see in the next section, by a historic shock which pushes one group into one equilibrium and
the other group into a di¤erent equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, these ndings are new.
Furthermore, they o¤er a new mechanism through which ethnic and group fragmentation may a¤ect
economic outcomes. For instance, the result stated in (T4) implies that individuals residing in more
ethnically diverse areas should demand more education than those residing in less diverse areas. It also
implies that members of a tribe that is more fragmented, say, along religious lines, should demand more
education than members of a less fragmented tribe. In the next section, we show how we empirically
test the model.
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1.2 Highlights of the Empirical Test
We empirically test the predictions of the model in the context of Nigeria, where ethnicity and religion
emerge as the two most important dimensions of identity. This country is composed of over 250
ethnic groups, and counts numerous religious denominations which we shall categorize as Christian
and Muslim for our purpose. It is common to aggregate the di¤erent ethnic groups based on linguistic
and cultural a¢ nities into ve major categories: The Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri of the core North, The
Igbo of South East, the Yoruba of the South West, The Isoko/Urhobo/Edo/Ijaw/Ek/Ibibio of the
Niger-Delta region, and the Tiv/Igala/Idoma/Gwari of Central Nigeria also known as the Middle-Belt
region (NISER (1997)).
There is a long documented history of a diverging attitude of Christians and Muslims towards
formal education in Nigeria, with the former being usually pro-schooling, and the latter resisting it as
a western "imperialist" institution (see Section 4.1). This is consistent with the existence of there being
two possible equilibria in large groups. Islam spread and consolidated in most of what later became
northern Nigeria by the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio about 1804. Historical records show that Koranic
schools were established in these regions, o¤ering a holistic education primarily consisting of teaching
Arabic literacy and recitation of the Quran from early childhood to adolescence (Fafunwa (1974),
Ajidagba (1998)). Western-type education was introduced by the Wesleyan Christian Missionaries in
1842 in the south. Its curriculum consisted of literary education in the reading, writing, arithmetic and
religion, preparing its recipients for new job opportunities as teachers, church evangelists or pastors,
clerks and interpreters. Many Muslims resisted this form of education and continue to do so even
in the present day, just as Christians viewed Koranic education as largely irrelevant. This reality is
evidenced in Figure 1, which shows the Christian-Muslim gap in formal educational attainment by
age. Muslims are at a disadvantage early on, and fall further behind over time, lagging Christians by
more than 4 years of education by age 24.
We examine the distribution of Christians and Muslims across ethnic groups in Nigeria, presented
in Figure 2. Christians are more concentrated among the Igbo (95%), the Niger-Delta (94%), the
Middle-Belt (67%) and the Yoruba (52%), but are the fewest among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri (0.5%).
Muslims are more concentrated among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri (99%), the Yoruba (46%) and the
Middle-Belt (31%), but are least represented among the Igbo (0.3%) and the Niger-Delta (2.4%). The
Yoruba are therefore more balanced or fragmented along religious lines than other ethnic groups, and
therefore should demand more formal education if our theoretical prediction is correct. It is also im-
portant to note that the varying distribution of religious beliefs across ethnic groups in Nigeria mostly
reects di¤erences in historical exposure to Christian and Islamic activities in this country. Nunn
(2010) provides compelling empirical evidence for the fact that the descendants of people that were
exposed to European missionaries in Africa more likely self-identify as Christian today, which shows
that Christian beliefs and values were transmitted across generations from parents to children until the
present day. In Section 4.1, we also argue that the same can be said about the generational di¤usion
of Islam. These facts ensure that religious a¢ liation, as ethnic or tribal a¢ liation, is exogenous, which
is useful for our econometric identication.
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We also examine the facts about investment in ethnic capital, proxied by investment in Koranic ed-
ucation.6 The statistics, presented in Figure 3, are self-explanatory. Among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri,
23.5% of children have only a Koranic education, in stark constrast to the Igbo (0.1%), the Yoruba
(0.4%), the Niger-Delta (0.4%) and the Middle-Belt (2.7%). Clearly, Koranic education is an impor-
tant alternative to formal education. Therefore, if our theory is correct, the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
people should lag behind in terms of formal schooling, whereas the other groups will tend to converge.
We now look at cross-ethnic di¤erences in investment in formal education, presented in Figure
4. Yoruba, Niger-Delta, and Igbo children, with 10 years of education by age 24, are consistently
more educated than the Middle-Belt (8 years) and the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri (4 years). Children in
this latter group, which is predominantly Muslim, as we have seen above, are most likely to invest
in Koranic education, losing ground with respect to investment in human capital early on, and their
disadvantage grows with age as they acquire education at a much lower speed.
We now attempt to explain these cross-group di¤erences in formal educational performance, ba-
sically testing our predictions (T1-1) and (T1-2). They may be attributable to demographic and
socioeconomic conditions that are known to vary across ethnic groups in most countries. In multi-
variate analyses, we therefore control for a range of individual and household level demographic and
socioeconomic variables. The advantage of the Yoruba over other ethnic groups declines in magnitude,
but remains statistically signicant.
Given that the formal educational infrastructure may not be evenly supplied across di¤erent re-
gions, the remaining di¤erences could be due to the fact that some ethnic groups benet more than
others. To address this issue, we control for neighborhood xed e¤ects, as individuals residing within
the same neighborhood have the same exposure to educational supply.7 We nd that the di¤erences
between the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Niger-Delta no longer persist, but the Middle-Belt and the
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri still lag behind the Yoruba. However, the disadvantage of the Middle-Belt van-
ishes among the 5-9 and the 15-19 year old individuals, whereas that of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri
remains economically and statistically signicant across all age groups.
The convergence among certain ethnic groups or tribes is consistent with the prediction stated in
(T1-1), whereas the diverging outcome of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri is consistent with the prediction
stated in (T1-2). Indeed, that the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals continue to lag behind after we
control for a range of factors clearly corroborates our earlier observation that investment in ethnic
capital (often in the form of religious education) is heavier in that group as compared to other groups.
However, according to our theory, high-ability individuals are more likely to choose human capital
over ethnic capital regardless of their group attachment to an oppositional norm. This implies that
cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational performance should be small among high-ability individuals
and more pronounced among those of low ability. We test and validate this theoretical prediction,
using parental education and wealth as proxies for child ability.8 Furthermore, to control for common
6There are several forms of ethnic capital in reality, but the only one for which we have data is Koranic education.
As we show in Section 4.1, the Muslim regions of Nigeria have historically supported Koranic schools as an important
means of building ethnic capital.
7A neighborhood in the data is a small area. It is a census tract.
8Ability is hard to observe in practice. However, a very large literature in Biology and Labor Economics shows that
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religious factors inherent in Islam, we replicate this test for Muslim individuals only, and we nd that
the poor performance of Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children relative to all other groups persists only for
those children whose parents have no education or are very poor, clearly validating prediction (T1-2).
Next, we test the prediction that an individual, regardless of his ability, is more likely to invest in
human capital if the number of high-ability individuals in his ethnic group is su¢ ciently large, as stated
in (T2). We proxy the number of high-ability individuals in an ethnic group by the neighborhood-
level share of adults in that group with at least a secondary school education. We do the computation
for each ethnic group, and estimate the e¤ects of the resulting variables on education, controlling
for all relevant variables, including parental education and wealth (our proxies for child ability). We
validate the model prediction. For example, a one-point increase in the neighborhood share of educated
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri adults increases education by 5.2 years among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children,
but has little e¤ect on children from other tribes. In general, these e¤ects are mostly conned within
ethnic groups, showing a clear network e¤ect.
Furthermore, we test prediction (T3) that individuals belonging to smaller ethnic groups are more
likely to invest in human capital than those belonging to larger groups. We test this prediction in
three di¤erent ways. First, we split the sample into Christians and Muslims, and estimate cross-ethnic
di¤erences in educational attainment for each religious group. Consistent with the theory, we nd
that educational attainment is higher for individuals belonging to ethnic groups where their religion is
less represented. For instance, Christian Igbo perform poorer than Christian Yoruba, whereas Muslim
Igbo perform better than Muslim Yoruba, which is consistent with there being more Christians among
the Igbo than the Yoruba, and less Muslim among the former than the latter. The second way to
test (T3) consists of comparing Muslims to Christians in each ethnic group. We nd that Muslims do
better than Christians in ethnic groups in which they are less represented such as among the Igbo and
the Niger-Delta. Similarly, Christians perform better than Muslims when they do not constitute a
large share of an ethnic group like among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. The third way to test (T3) is to
estimate the e¤ect of an individuals ethnic group representation in a neighborhood on his educational
attainment. For each individual, we compute the share of his ethnic group in the neighborhood in
which he resides, and use the resulting variable to predict his education, while controlling for all other
variables. We nd that individuals belonging to smaller groups perform better than those belonging
to larger groups.
As a corollary of the latter prediction, ethnic fragmentation should have a positive e¤ect on the
demand for formal education as stated in (T4). Indeed, we nd that individuals who reside in more
ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods have more education. Interestingly, when we control both for
parental socioeconomic status as determined by education and wealth are good proxies for child ability measured by IQ
and cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2011), Currie (2009), Currie and Moretti (2003),
Lundborg, Nilsson and Rooth (2012), Almond and Currie (2011)). Indeed, higher parental SES has a positive e¤ect on
a range of childrens health indicators (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002), Glewwe (1999), Pongou, Ezzati and Salomon
(2006), Pongou, Salomon and Ezzati (2006), Currie (2009)), and better health in childhood positively a¤ects mental and
cognitive ability (Weinreb et al. (2002), Glewwe and Jacoby (1993), Chang et al. (2002), Currie (2009), Currie and
Stabile (2006), Currie (2000)), as well as productivity in adulthood (Currie et al. (2010)).
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the size of an individuals ethnic group and ethnic fragmentation, only the latter variable remains
statistically signicant, further validating the model mechanism that the positive e¤ect of ethnic
fragmentation on the demand for formal education is just a reection of the positive e¤ect of ethnic
minority status on this outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we situate our study within the
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and its predictions. We test the model in Section
4, and conclude our study in Section 5. All the proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Closely Related Literature
Our paper is related to works linking ethnic identity and educational choice/employment decision. An
important contribution to this literature is Fordham and Ogbu (1986). They advance the "oppositional
culture" hypothesis to explain the low educational performance of African American students. They
claim that African American students view school education as part of white norms from which they
wish to disassociate themselves. Any black student striving to excel in school is viewed as "acting
white". This line of thought has also been pursued in economics by Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005)
who model the phenomenon of "acting white" by allowing agents to signal their types to the job market
as well as to their peers. Bloch and Rao (2001) show that in the presence of statistical discrimination,
high productivity members of the minority group have an incentive to adopt the social behavior of
the dominant group. Battu, Mwale and Zenou (2005) consider a model of employment and choice of
identity, where members of minority groups can choose to downplay their identities and identify more
with the mainstream culture and hence be more likely to be employed but at the cost of alienating
themselves from their ethnic community. Selod and Zenou (2006) look at a search-matching model
where agents use racial networks to nd jobs. The probability of the job arriving also depends on the
distance from job. Patacchini and Zenou (2006) look at school performance by blacks and whites. In
their model, the school performance of all students turns out to be a function of the human capital
(education) levels of parents as well as the average human capital of parents of friends. Their result
is consistent with Borjas (1992) who nds that a childs human capital is totally determined by the
parents human capital as well as the average human capital of his ethnic community. Borjas (1992)
also argues that if parentshuman capital di¤ers by ethnicity, this is likely to persist across several
generations. Our results are consistent with Borjas (1992). However, we di¤er from the previous
literature in that we simultaneously consider individual and group level determinants of educational
investment. In this respect, our identication of a threshold size below which any ethnic group has all
its members investing in human capital is new.
Our study also contributes to the literature linking religion to economic prosperity. Studies on
this topic have mainly focused on the e¤ect of Protestantism on economic growth, inspired by the
Max Webers theory that the Protestant work ethic was the main reason for which Protestant regions
were more economically prosperous than Catholic regions in Europe.9 Sascha Becker and Ludger
9See, e.g., Barro and McCleary (2003, 2005), Blum and Dudley (2001), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003, 2006),
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Woessmann (2009) propose a "human capital theory of Protestant economic history", arguing that
because Martin Luther wanted Protestants to read the Bible by themselves, Protestants promoted
universal schooling, which in turn generated the human capital needed for economic activities. The
e¤ect of Islam on human capital accumulation or growth has attracted less attention. Most of the
few studies on this use cross-country data, and therefore cannot adequately separate the e¤ect of
religion from other country level factors that may a¤ect outcomes. In contrast, we use household-
level data that enable us to control for neighborhood xed e¤ects, allowing us to address endogeneity
issues related to self-selection into certain areas or to the non-random supply of formal educational
infrastructure.
By showing that inequalities in human capital accumulation across ethnic and religious groups in
Nigeria are partially due to the fact that certain members of historically Muslim communities choose
Koranic education as an alternative to formal education, we prove that these inequalities are also a
consequence of di¤erential historical exposure to Christianity and Islam during the colonial period. In
this regard, our ndings are consistent with studies on the historical origins of di¤erences in cultures,
norms, and economic outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008), Nunn (2009), Tabellini (2010),
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)).
Our paper is also related to the very large literature on conformity and the formation and persis-
tence of identity, culture, and social norms.10 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the psychology
and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior, and show that identity determines
economic outcomes. In their model, identity is dened by "a persons self-image" and her assigned
category, each category being characterized by a set of prescriptions and norms indicating the be-
havior to which individuals in the category should conform. Conforming to or deviating from her
category-prescribed norms results in gains or losses in identity. The model sheds light on di¤erences
in school achievement across di¤erent categories of students. Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier and Zenou
(2010) present a model of identity formation, where the identity of the child depends on the parents
socialization e¤ort and on how assimilated the child is with the dominant outside culture. Munshi
and Wilson (2010) look at the role of identity in mobility. As in our model, they allow people to
choose between two forms of capital accumulation, and this choice determines the probability of social
mobility. Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003) study the cost and benets of adopting a mulato or a black
racial identity among the African-American population in the mid-nineteenth century.
Our assumption that ethnic groups play the role of social networks through which members may
obtain information about job opportunities is consistent with empirical studies that have found social
contacts to play an important role in labor market and other economic outcomes (Granovetter (1973,
1995), Fafchamps (2003)). Similar assumptions have motivated theoretical studies on the role of
exogenous networks on employment and inequality (e.g., Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2005),
Montgomery (2001), Topa (2001), Zenou (2009)). Importantly, our empirical ndings also corroborate
this assumption, as the positive e¤ects of community human capital on youth education are mostly
George Becker (1997), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008), Goldin and Katz (2000), Glaeser and Glendon (1998).
10See, e.g., Bernheim (1994), Akerlof (1980), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Fershtman
and Weiss (1998), Kandori (1992), Akerlof (1980), and Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2008).
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conned within ethnic groups.
There are only a few empirical studies that have examined the e¤ect of identity on education
and employment, and most of them focus on the U.S., Canada and Europe (e.g., Fordham and Ogbu
(1986), Ainsworth-Darell and Downey (1998), Fryer and Levitt (2004), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005),
Fryer and Torelli (2009), Constant and Zimmermann (2008), Battu and Zenou (2010), Pendakur
and Pendakur (2005), Calvó-Armengol, Pattachini and Zenou (2009)). With a notable exception
(Ainsworth-Darell and Downey (1998)), there is a large consensus in these literatures that identity
matters in determining outcomes, with those who adopt an oppositional culture or those who do not
integrate or assimilate with the majority culture lagging behind.
While our model contains some of the elements of all these other studies (e.g., peers e¤ects, seg-
regation, strategic complementaries, etc.), our analysis, scope and results di¤er in some important
respects. Our main contribution consists of identifying important individual- and group-level determi-
nants of human capital versus ethnic capital accumulation. First, our ndings imply that group-level
di¤erences in human capital do not necessarily need to be explained by di¤erences in initial attitude
towards education or ability. In fact, two ex ante identical groups may end up diverging in average
educational attainment (see prediction (T1-2)). The only default explanation for such a divergence
is that the two groups are separated. Second, by treating di¤erent ethnic groups as separate local
economies as in Lundberg and Startz (1998), we identify a threshold such that when the size of an
ethnic group is smaller than the threshold, all its members will choose to invest in human capital (as
opposed to ethnic capital). Importantly, this result implies that members of the same ethnic group who
reside in di¤erent locations within a country are likely to di¤er with respect to how they accumulate
human capital, with smaller subgroups faring better than larger subgroups. This result sheds light on
the observation that second and subsequent generation migrants whose parents have left their region
of origin to settle in another region within a country generally do better than their co-ethnics who
have remained in their homeland. While this has usually been explained by the positive selectivity of
migrants, our results suggest that the same outcome would obtain even if migrants do not di¤er from
non-migrants in terms of ability distribution. Moreover, we nd that an individuals attachment to
an oppositional culture depends on his ability and on the average ability of the members of his ethnic
community, and we test all these predictions empirically.
We also nd theoretically and empirically that local ethnic fragmentation, by creating smaller
groups, positively a¤ects the demand for formal education. Given the essential role of human capital
in the production of wealth in technologically advanced societies (Gary Becker (1962, 1964), Galor and
Weil (2000), Acemoglu (2009), Mincer (1974)), our results imply that local ethnic fragmentation may
have a positive e¤ect on local economic growth by positively a¤ecting the likelihood that individuals
pursue formal education. Other studies have shown that ethnic fragmentation slows economic growth
and negatively a¤ects the supply of public goods (e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), Miguel and Gugerty
(2005), see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) and Costa and Kahn (2003) for a comprehensive review of
literature). In general, these other studies postulate that di¤erent ethnic groups, for diverse reasons,
nd it di¢ cult to cooperate in order to induce and/or enforce optimal economic policies. But the
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evidence on this is mixed, as a recent study has shown that ethnic diversity is associated with positive
economic growth in Africa (Cinyabuguma and Putterman (2011)). Also, using rm-level data, Ellison,
Greenbaum and Mullin (2010) show that more heterogeneous o¢ ces in a rm enjoy less social goods
such as cooperation and satisfaction, but perform better than those that are more homogeneous. By
proposing a new mechanism through which ethnic fragmentation a¤ects human capital "demand", we
view our theoretical and empirical ndings as complementary to the existing body of research, which,
unlike our study, has essentially focused on the e¤ect of ethnic fragmentation on the "supply" of public
goods. To our knowledge, our study is the rst to document theoretically and empirically the e¤ect
of ethnic fragmentation on the demand for schooling, while controlling for the supply of educational
infrastructure.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
A society is partitioned into C ethnic groups G1; ::; GC .11 Each ethnic group Gc (c = 1; :::; C) is a
local social interactions economy
Gc = (Ec; (Ui)i2Ec ; (ai)i2Ec)
where Ec is the set of individuals belonging to the group, Ui the utility function of individual i,
and ai the ability level of i. For each c = 1; :::; C, Ec is nite and we denote its cardinality by nc.
A local economy Gc is therefore entirely dened by its exogenous features which are its group size,
its utility prole, and its ability distribution. In what follows, we describe the characteristics of each
individual in a group and the decision problem he faces.
In each group, each individual i is endowed with one unit of time that he invests in "ethnic capital",
denoted by kei , and "human capital", denoted by k
h
i . We therefore assume that investments in both
types of capital are such that:
kei + k
h
i = 1, with k
e
i  0 and khi  0.
Human capital can be thought of as formal or mainstream education, whereas ethnic capital may
be accumulated by attending religious schools run within the ethnic community or by spending time
within the community.
We also assume that the benet to an individual from investing in either form of capital is increasing
in the total investment by his ethnic community in that form of capital. This assumption can be
motivated by thinking that an individual is more likely to nd a job in the sector in which he has
invested if the number of the members of his ethnic group who have also invested in the same sector is
11 In this theoretical model, the phrase "ethnic group" designates a culturally homogeneous group such as a tribe or a
religion. In the empirical section, we will distinguish between ethnicity and religion, the former referring to membership
in a tribe.
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higher. Indeed, if we think of an ethnic group as a network through which an individual gets jobs, then
an individuals job search network is as strong as the number of other individuals of his community
who choose to invest in the same form of capital as him. For each ethnic group Gc, we dene total
investment in ethnic capital and human capital by the variables Eec and E
h
c , respectively, where:
Eec =
X
i2Ec
kei
and
Ehc =
X
i2Ec
khi .
Our assumption then translates into a utility function where the benet from khi (resp. k
e
i ) is increasing
in Ehc (resp. E
e
c ).
We further assume that the ability of each individual i is bounded below by 1: ai > 1. Also,
investing in human capital is more valuable for higher ability individuals.
All the variables dened above enter the utility function of each individual i as follows:
Ui = U(E
h
c ; E
e
c ; k
h
i ; k
e
i ; ai)
As per our discussion above, the utility function has two main features. First, it exhibits a form of
strategic complementaries between an individual and his ethnic group in that an individuals utility
is positively a¤ected by increased investment of his ethnic community in the form of capital in which
he is more invested. Second, investing in human capital should be more valuable for high ability
individuals. To capture these two features, we envision a natural utility function of the form:
U(Ehc ; E
e
c ; k
h
i ; k
e
i ; ai) = E
h
c  khi + ai  khi + Eec  kei .
Proposition 1 below states most of the important properties of this utility function.
Proposition 1 Let Gc = (Ec; (Ui)i2Ec ; (ai)i2Ec) be a local economy where:
Ui = U(k
h
i ; k
e
i ; ai; E
h
c ; E
e
c ) = E
h
c  khi + ai  khi + Eec  kei .
We have the following properties:
P1. If Ec = fig, i will invest only in human capital no matter his ability.
P2. If Ehc  Eec , then @U@khi > 0.
P3. If Ehc  Eec , then @U@khi will be negative for low levels of ai but positive for high levels of ai.
P4. The marginal benets of total community investments are such that:
@U
@Ehc
> 0 if khi  1=2 and
@U
@Eec
> 0 if kei  1=2.
P5. For any khi > 0,
@U
@ai
> 0.
12
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix. Property (P1) says that if an ethnic group has only
one member, this member is better o¤ investing in human capital than in ethnic capital. Obviously,
there are no benets from networking in a one-person community, which implies that one is better o¤
choosing the more lucrative form of investment which is human capital. Properties (P2)-(P4) describe
a form of strategic complementarities between an individual and his ethnic group. Property (P2)
says that if the majority of the community is invested in human capital, an individuals benets are
increasing in his investment in human capital as well. Indeed, given that most of his community is
invested in human capital, his network in the skilled sector is stronger than in the unskilled sector.
Hence, he is better o¤ the more he invests in human capital. Property (P3) says that if the majority
of the community is invested in ethnic capital, a members utility is either decreasing or increasing in
human capital depending on his ability. This property takes into account the ability of the person.
Had ability not been a factor, we might have expected utility to be always decreasing in investments
in human capital whenever the community is more invested in ethnic capital. This property allows for
the possibility that high-ability individuals may still prefer human capital investments. Property (P4)
says that if an individual is more invested in one form of capital, his utility is increasing in his ethnic
communitys total investment in that form of capital. This again highlights the network benets.
Property (P5) says that an individuals utility is increasing in ability as long as he invests any positive
amount in human capital. This property is equivalent to saying that investing in human capital is less
costly for higher-ability individuals.
In the next section, we state our main theoretical results and derive testable implications. It is
important to note that these results are valid for an innite class of utility functions and not just the
utility function dened above. In fact, our results are valid for the class of utility functions satisfying
properties (P1)-(P5) in Proposition 1. This class is innite, as any positive a¢ ne transformation of
the utility function dened above satises these properties. Some utility functions that may not be
obtained by an a¢ ne transformation of our benchmark utility function satisfy these properties as well,
such as the utility obtained by replacing ai by
p
ai.
3.2 Main Results
Each local economy Gc is a non-cooperative social interactions game. The concept of Nash equilibrium,
dened below, therefore appears as a natural solution concept for this game.
Denition 1 A Nash equilibrium for each economy Gc is a vector Kh = (k
h
i )i2Ec of human capital
choices such that for any individual i and alternative strategy kh
0
i , we have:
U(khi ; k
h
 i; ai)  U(kh
0
i ; k
h
 i; ai)
where
U(khi ; k
h
 i; ai) = U(k
h
i ; E
h
c ; ai) and
U(kh
0
i ; k
h
 i; ai) = U(k
h0
i ; E
h
c   khi + kh
0
i ; ai)
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with
Ehc =
X
i2Ec
khi .
A Nash equilibrium of the global economy (the economy consisting of all the local economies) is a
vector whose components are the Nash equilibria of the local economies.
We now state our main results, which we prove in the appendix. Our rst result says that if a
group is small enough, its members will always choose to invest in human capital regardless of their
ability. This follows intuitively, since small communities o¤er little network benets; each member is
therefore better o¤ investing in human capital and being able to search in the more lucrative formal
sector. This result is a generalization of property (P1) in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold E such that all the members of an ethnic community of
size smaller than E will choose to invest only in human capital in equilibrium, which means that
Kh = (1; :::; 1).
Our second result says that in large enough ethnic groups, high-ability members always fully
invest in human capital regardless of the choices of the other members of the community. Intuitively,
an individual of su¢ ciently high ability who invests in human capital always derives a higher utility
level than if he invest a fraction of his time in ethnic capital.
Proposition 3 A Nash equilibrium Kh is such that for an ethnic community Ec of size greater than
E, there exists ac such that individuals with ability higher than ac will always choose to invest in
human capital.
The next result states that in a large community, if the number of high-ability individuals is few,
low-ability individuals will invest in the "same" form of capital, which could be ethnic capital or
human capital. However, if the number of high-ability individuals is su¢ ciently large, the remaining
members of the community, regardless of their ability, will choose to invest in human capital.
Proposition 4 A Nash equilibrium Kh is such that for any ethnic community Ec of size greater than
E,
 If the number of individuals with ability higher than ac is not too large, the remaining individuals
of the ethnic community will either choose to invest in human or ethnic capital.
 If the number of individuals with ability higher than ac is large enough, the remaining individuals
of the ethnic community will also choose to invest in human capital.
Intuitively, this result is driven by the fact that low-ability members will not derive much benet
from ethnic capital if there are too few of them. Thus, when the number of high-ability members is
large enough, given that these individuals always choose to invest in human capital (Proposition 3),
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the remaining members of the community are better o¤ investing in human capital as well. When
the number of high-ability members is not too large, the low-ability members are always better o¤
choosing the same form of investment because they care more about the network benets.
The fourth result says that ethnic fragmentation positively a¤ects the demand for human capital.
This result follows from the fact that ethnic fragmentation results in smaller ethnic groups, and
members of small ethnic groups are more likely to invest in human capital (Proposition 2), ceteris
paribus.
Proposition 5 Let P = fE1; :::; ECg and P 0 = fE01; :::; E0C0g be two partitions of N where P 0 results
from splitting one or more ethnic groups in P . Assume that the probability of the realization of each
of the two equilibria of large groups is the same across these groups. Then, the average level of human
capital accumulated is higher under P 0 than under P .
3.3 Number of Nash Equilibria
We summarize the nding in Propositions 2-5 in terms of the number of Nash equilibria, and derive
testable implications. In each local economy, the number of Nash equilibria is at least 1 and at most
2 depending on exogenous group characteristics which are size and ability distributions:
Summary 1 The number of Nash equilibria in a local economy depends on its exogenous character-
istics as follows:
1. If the group is small enough, all members invest in human capital (1 equilibrium).
2. If the group is large and rich enough in ability, all members invest in human capital (1 equilib-
rium).
3. If the group is large and poor in ability, there are 2 equilibria:
(a) In one equilibrium, all members invest in human capital.
(b) In the other equilibrium, high-ability members invest in human capital and low-ability mem-
bers invest in ethnic capital.
3.4 Testable Implications
The summary of our ndings in the previous section clearly shows that the demand for human capital
by an individual is a¤ected positively by his ability and his groups ability, and negatively by his groups
size. Furthermore, the ndings have implications for group inequality in human capital investment.
We empirically test the following predictions of the model.
T1-1. Two groups which are not necessarily identical will converge in human capital accumulation if
they are su¢ ciently small or if they are su¢ ciently rich in ability, ceteris paribus.
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T1-2. Two groups which are identical in size and ability distribution may diverge in human capital
accumulation. Such a divergence, however, would only occur among the low-ability members of
both groups.
T2. Being a member of an ability-rich ethnic group positively a¤ects the demand for human capital.
T3. Being in a smaller group positively a¤ects the demand for human capital.
T4. Ethnic and group fragmentation increases the demand for human capital.
The rst prediction (T1-1) comes from items (1) and (2) of Summary 1, according to which members
of groups that are su¢ ciently small or rich in ability all invest in human capital. In this case, there is
clearly no cross-group di¤erence in human capital level. The second prediction (T1-2) derives directly
from item (3) according to which there are two Nash equilibria if a group is su¢ ciently large and poor
in ability. It implies that two ex ante identical groups may nd themselves in di¤erent equilibria.
The empirical implications are deep. Especially, it means that human capital group di¤erences do not
imply that one group is smarter than the other ex ante. It also means that in a multivariate regression
of human capital on group identity, group di¤erences may not disappear after all imaginable controls
are included. However, when two groups di¤er in human capital investment, that divergence only
occurs among the low-ability members of both groups. This is because the high-ability members of
each group always invest in human capital regardless of group characteristics, so there is cross-group
convergence among them. Our third prediction (T2) that members of groups that are rich in ability
invest more in human capital regardless of their individual ability comes from item (2) of Summary 1.
The fourth prediction (T3) that being in member of a smaller group increases the demand for human
capital comes from item (1) of Summary 1. This prediction also implies that if an ethnic group is
split by religion, then the smallest subgroup will invest more in human capital. Also, it implies that
ethnic groups that are more spatially dispersed invest more in human capital than groups that are
more concentrated, even holding ability distribution xed. Our fth testable prediction (T4) comes
from the fact that ethnic fragmentation leads to smaller ethnic groups, and small groups invest more
in human capital. In the next section, we will test each of these predictions of the model.
4 The Empirical Test
We test the predictions of the model using data from Nigeria, where ethnicity and religion have emerged
as the two most important dimensions of identity. We do not have any evidence that the specic ethnic
groups in the country promote or discourage formal education. However, religion is clearly a factor in
the decision of certain individuals to acquire education. In the next section, we briey document the
historical role of Christianity and Islam in the spread of formal and religious education in Nigeria.
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4.1 Religion and Education in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective on the Develop-
ment of an Oppositional Culture
Islam was spread and consolidated in most of what later became northern Nigeria by the Jihad of
Uthman Dan Fodio about 1804. Historical records show that the introduction of Islam was accompa-
nied by the spread of its own form of holistic education (Fafunwa (1974), Ajidagba (1998)). Islamic
education and Arabic learning were simultaneously taught in schools in the region. As a result of the
political and social inuence which Islam and Koranic learning conferred on those possessing it, many
rulers employed Islamic scholars as administrators and Islamic education was supported by northern
Nigerian leaders and Northern Region Ministry of Education. Unlike modern formal schools, Islamic
schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course
of study. There is no clear-cut division into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. There is no pro-
gression from one class to another and from one level to another, with examination barriers erected
along the way. There are no age limits or rigid timetable with neatly timed periods for subjects
(Umar (2003), Abdurrahman and Canham (1978)). Islamic knowledge is acquired through a master-
disciple relationship sustained by face-to-face oral instructions that transmit spiritual guidance, moral
authority, piety and blessing (Mohammed and Khan (1981)).
Despite the perception of great spiritual value, one obvious potential disadvantage of this edu-
cational curriculum is its focus on Arabic, which is not the language of literature, instruction and
correspondence in Nigeria. Also, the transmission of spiritual and moral values is privileged over the
acquisition of other forms of knowledge and skills that are valued in a market economy (Suleiman
(1995), Sulaiman (2001), Okoye and Yau (1999)).
Western-type education was widely introduced in Nigeria following the arrival of Wesleyan Chris-
tian missionaries at Badagry in 1842. Although literary education in the 4Rs (reading, writing,
arithmetic and religion) was predominant, this new missionary education prepared the recipients for
new job opportunities, as teachers, church evangelists or pastors, clerks and interpreters. Emphasis
was also placed on character training. Most of the missions established primary schools and, initially,
little emphasis was given to secondary or tertiary education. But following pressure from inuential
church members, who were rich merchants and emigrants living in Lagos, the CMS Grammar School
was established in 1857 in Lagos.
Western-type education spread more quickly in the south than in the north of Nigeria in part
because of the skepticism of the Muslims with regards to the value of an education proposed by Chris-
tian missionaries. It is estimated that there were about 25,000 Koranic schools already in existence
in northern Nigeria in 1914. Thus, the spread of western-style education met sti¤ opposition except
among the indigenous peoples of the North Central geopolitical zone, where Christian missionaries did
succeed in establishing schools, at times in collaboration with Government. Abdulkarim (2010) links
the educational orientation of Muslim communities and their reluctance to embrace western-oriented
education to the belief that it was not supportive of Islamic education, and possibly actively tried to
destroy it. Consequently the phenomenon of educational dualism has been historically entrenched in
Nigeria (Umar (2003)).
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Several scholars have argued that Koranic schools in northern Nigeria are an alternative to formal
education, and in fact represent an institutionalized resistance to it (see, e.g., Winters (1987), Koehl
(1983), Urwick (1984)). Bray (1981) identied Kano State, the largest Hausa/Fulani state in Nigeria,
as one of the states in which implementation of the 1976-1980 Universal Primary Education scheme
encountered the most di¢ culty, owing to the strength of the "rival" tradition of Koranic education
and to the low level of existing enrolment in "western-type" schools. A survey of 1,998 pastoral
Fulani reported that about half (50%) had Koranic education, forty percent had no education, and
only seven percent had either formal or both mainstream and Koranic education (Iro (2007)). In a
1993 nationwide survey, NISER (1997) recorded the widespread of Koranic education among ethnic
groups in northern Nigeria generally, and notably among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. The data shows that
23.5% of the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children aged 5-24 attended Koranic schools and this proportion
constitutes 95% of youth of that age group who attended such schools throughout the country.
Recent changes have given rise to new Islamic schools called the madrasa, some of which o¤er a
modied national public school curriculum. Yet they di¤er in their fundamental institutional orienta-
tion. School administrators actively foster Islamic identity and awareness among students and teach-
ers through congressional prayers, images of the Islamic world, and Islamic dress for females (Umar
(2003)). While these features collectively create a distinctly Islamic atmosphere in these schools,
it is the curricular emphasis on Arabic and Islamic Studies that really shape their Islamic charac-
ter and orientation, and di¤erentiate them from both the old Islamic educational institutions and
Nigerias public schools. Among other goals, madrasa curriculum aims to foster Islamic identity and
consciousness with competencies in Arabic and Islamic studies to "equip students to orient their lives
in accordance with Sharia" (Umar (2003)), whereas the national curriculum aims at "self-realization,
better human relationship, individual and national e¢ ciency, e¤ective citizenship, national conscious-
ness, national unity, as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political, scientic and technological
progress" (Federal Government of Nigeria (1981)).
4.2 Data
This study utilizes a sample of 30,746 male and female individuals aged 5-24, pooled from the 1999 and
2003 Nigeria Demographic and Health Surveys. They are nationally representative, and were designed
to provide representative estimates of population and health indicators for all regions and ethnic
groups of the country. They used a two-stage probabilistic sampling technique to select clusters (or
neighborhoods) at the rst stage and households at the second stage. Clusters were selected from each
State of the country. The surveys used household questionnaires to obtain information on members
of a household, housing characteristics including living facilities, household composition, and place
and region of residence. The individual questionnaires for males and females provided information
on demographic, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics including gender, age, education, marital
status, migration status, religion, and ethnicity.
The outcome variable we analyze is the number of years of education acquired. Our main inde-
pendent variable is ethnicity (or membership in a tribe). The DHS data provided information on 113
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ethnic groups. In this study, we borrow from the NISER (1997) classication and aggregate these
groups into ve major categories: the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri of the core North, The Igbo of the South
East, the Yoruba of the South West, The Isoko/Urhobo/Edo/Ijaw/Ek/Ibibio of the Niger-Delta re-
gion and the Tiv/Igala/Idoma/Gwari of the Central region, also known as the Middle-Belt. There
was a mixture of other groups that do not t into these core groups. This mixture is labeled in this
study as "Other ethnicity". It is important to note that, except for the category "Other ethnicity",
these groupings represent the best approximation of distinct cultural identities in Nigeria, mirroring
geographical, economic, political and religious enclaves (NISER (1997)).
In order to explain cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment, we control for a range of
individual, household and neighborhood level factors, the details of which are presented in Table
1. These factors are inspired by the vast literature on human capital, and they measure various
inputs into education. Their levels are likely to vary across ethnic groups. The individual level
variables are child gender, age and relationship to the household head. The inclusion of the latter
variable could be explained by the fact that parents may tend to invest more in biological children,
but kinship obligations vary across ethnic lines, and some ethnic groups may tend to di¤erentiate
less between biological and non-biological children. The household level factors controlled for are
the characteristics of the household head (gender, age, education and religion), as well as household
wealth per capita.12 We also control for neighborhood xed e¤ect, therefore taking into account all
community-level variables.
4.3 Empirical Results
4.3.1 Cross-Ethnic Di¤erences in Educational Attainment: Convergence and Diver-
gence
We test our rst two predictions (T1-1) and (T1-2) regarding cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational
attainment. We use specications of the form:
Educir = Ethnicityi+X + r + "ir (1)
where Educir is the number of years of education attained by a person i living in neighbordhood r,
and Ethnicityi a vector of ethnic groups (or tribes) including Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, Igbo, Niger-Delta
groups, Middle-Belt groups and "Other ethnicity". The Yoruba ethnic group is the reference group. X
is a vector of variables including individual, household and neighborhood level variables; r captures
the neighborhood e¤ect, and "ir is the individual random e¤ect.  is the main parameter of interest.
Because of di¤erential supply of education across neighborhoods and the possible correlation between
neighborhood and ethnicity (i.e. E(rEthnicityi) 6= 0), we estimate neighborhood xed e¤ects. This
12Household wealth is an asset-based index. It is constructed based on possession of assets such as the physical
quality of the home (materials for roof, wall, and oor), means of personal transportation (bicycle, motorcycle, car),
and household durables (radio, TV, video, electricity, piped water, etc.). We construct this index using the principal
component analysis (Filmer and Pritchett (2001), Montogomery et al. (2000)). We then divide it by the number of
household members.
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ensures that the supply of education is similar for all individuals living in the same neighborhood
and that  only estimates di¤erences in the demand for education. Because ethnicity (or tribe), like
race, is exogenous13, the estimate of  measures the causal e¤ect of ethnic-related cultural factors on
educational attainment. After controlling for a range of individual, household and neighborhood level
characteristics, we argue that the remaining di¤erences in educational attainment across ethnic groups
is consistent with the existence of two equilibria as predicted by the theory. In one of these equilibria,
low-ability children invest in ethnic capital, expressing attachment to an oppositional culture.
The results are presented in Table 2. We note substantial di¤erences between groups. Col-
umn (I), which includes only the ethnicity dummies, shows that Igbo, Niger-Delta, Middle-Belt and
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children lag behind their Yoruba counterparts by an average of 0.49, 0.42, 1.81
and 4.05 years of education, respectively. In subsequent columns (Columns (II)-(V)), we control for
a range of factors to determine how much of these di¤erences can be explained by the data. Column
(II) controls for child characteristics including age, gender, and relationship with the household head,
as well as a dummy indicator for the year 2003. We nd that the relative disadvantage of Middle-Belt
and Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children over Yoruba children falls, whereas the advantage of the latter over
other ethnic groups increases, although the coe¢ cients do not di¤er much from those of Column (I).
This indicates that cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational achievement are unlikely to be explained by
child factors.
In Column (III), we additionally control for household characteristics including the household
heads age, gender, education and religion, as well as place of residence and household wealth. Con-
trolling for parental education in particular is consistent with studies that have shown a causal impact
of this variable on child education (see, e.g., Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005)). The estimates
show that the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children now lag behind the Yoruba children by only 1.6 years of
education. When comparing this coe¢ cient to that of Column (I), we estimate that over 60% of the
education gap between the two groups can be explained by the relative socioeconomic disadvantage of
the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children and by religious factors. We also note that the relative disadvantage
of Middle-Belt children compared to their Yoruba counterparts decreases by almost 50%. However,
the gap between the Yoruba and the other groups (Igbo, Niger-Delta) continues to grow. In Column
(IV), we control for state xed e¤ects, but the di¤erences do not disappear.
We now seek to determine whether the remaining di¤erences could be explained by the supply
of education, as this might vary across neighborhoods within a state. Since we do not have data
on the supply of education, we control for neighborhood xed e¤ects (Column (V)), relying on the
assumption that individuals residing within the same neighborhood likely enjoy access to the same
educational infrastructure supplied by the federal government, the state or any other organization. We
nd that the advantage of Yoruba children over their counterparts from other ethnic groups declines in
magnitude and statistical signicance. Indeed, the Igbo and Niger-Delta children are no longer lagging
behind (Column (V)). However, the Middle-Belt and Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children are still trailing
13 In the literature, ethnicity and race are always considered exogenous (e.g., Fryer and Levitt (2004)) because they are
not choice variables. Membership in a tribe or a racial group is by birth.
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their Yoruba counterparts by 0.65 and 0.96 years of education, respectively, strongly suggesting that
a lower demand for (rather than a limited supply of) education explains the poor performance of the
former.
As incentives to invest in education might vary by age, we try to understand whether cross-ethnic
di¤erences in educational achievement depend on child age. In Table 3, we replicate the analysis of
Table 2 for four separate age groups: 5-9 (Panel A), 10-14 (Panel B), 15-19 (Panel C) and 20-24 (Panel
D). Qualitatively, the ndings do not di¤er much from those obtained in Table 2. In all age groups,
the advantage of Yoruba children over the Igbo and the Niger-Delta disappears when all variables are
controlled for (Columns (V)). Further, the relative disadvantage of the Middle-Belt children is only
visible among the 10-14 and the 20-24 year olds. However, Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children consistently
lag behind, with their distance to the Yoruba increasing with age. We also note that the model ts the
data pretty well, as it explains over 60 percent of the variation in the outcome (Columns (III)-(V)).
The results validate prediction (T1-1) on the possibility of ethnic groups converging in the average
level of education. We note that convergence occur among the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Niger-Delta,
and to a certain extent the Middle-Belt, which have comparable sizes. The diverging outcome of the
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, which are much larger in size, is consistent with the existence of an equilibrium
in which certain individuals in that group invest only in ethnic capital, as stated in (T1-2). Indeed,
Figure 3 supports this view, as it shows that among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, 23.5% of children have
only a Koranic education, in stark constrast to the Igbo (0.1%), the Yoruba (0.4%), the Niger-Delta
(0.4%) and the Middle-Belt (2.7%). We will also show next, to complete the test of prediction (T1-2),
that cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational investment are pronounced only among children of low
ability.
4.3.2 Cross-Ethnic Di¤erences in Educational Attainment are Concentrated in Low-
Ability Individuals Only
In this section, we complete the test of prediction (T1-2) that cross-ethnic di¤erences in education
should be more pronounced among low-ability individuals due to the fact that high-ability children
choose education over ethnic capital, regardless of the degree of adherence of their group to oppositional
norms.
We proxy an individuals ability by the education of his households head and by his households
wealth.14 The results are presented in Table 4. In Panel A, we regress education on ethnicity dummies
controlling for all relevant factors (including neighborhood xed e¤ects) as in Column (V) of Table
2. In Column (I), we use the entire sample, but in subsequent columns, the analysis is restricted
to individuals whose parents have no education (Column (II)), primary education (Column (III)),
14As noted in footnote 8, ability is hard to observe in practice. However, it has been argued that it can be proxied
by parental education and wealth, as these factors predict childrens IQ and cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Løken,
Mogstad and Wiswall (2011), Currie (2009), Currie and Moretti (2003), Lundborg, Nilsson and Rooth (2012)). Some of
these studies have demonstrated that these e¤ects are causal, whereas others have argued that they might simply reect
the fact that parents and their o¤spring share common genes. In either case, parental education and wealth correctly
proxy child ability.
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secondary education (Column (IV)), and university education (Column (V)). We e¤ectively nd that
cross-ethnic di¤erences in years of education attained are concentrated among low-ability children.
For instance, Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri individuals lag behind their Yoruba counterparts by 1.7 years of
education when parents have no education, and by only 0.4 years of education when parents have a
university education, with the latter e¤ect being statistically insignicant. In general, cross-ethnic dif-
ferences in educational attainment become economically smaller and in most cases lose their statistical
signicance as ability increases.
In Panel B, we replicate the analysis shown in Panel A for Muslim individuals only. This controls
for common factors inherent in Islam, but at the same time, allows for the fact that adherence to
Islamic norms and traditions may vary across ethnic groups in Nigeria. We nd no signicant cross-
ethnic di¤erences in years of education attained for individuals whose parents have at least a primary
level education. But cross-ethnic di¤erences are detectible only among individuals whose parents have
no education.
In Panel C, we estimate cross-ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment across quintiles of house-
hold wealth. We nd huge ethnic inequalities only among poor children (those whose households fall
in the rst and second wealth quintiles), and in general decrease as household wealth increases. When
we replicate this analysis for Muslim individuals only (Panel D), the results are even stronger.15
In general, our ndings validate the prediction of the model that cross-ethnic di¤erences in educa-
tional attainment are most likely to be very small among high-ability children, as they all choose human
capital over social capital regardless of their ethnic communitys adherence to oppositional norms. We
note that our results are not driven by the di¤erential supply of education across groups, as we control
for neighborhood xed e¤ects. The ndings clearly suggest that among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, it is
the low-ability children that invest only in Koranic education, whereas children of comparable ability
in other ethnic groups invest in formal education, clearly showing the existence of two equilibria as
stated in (T1-2).
4.3.3 The Number of High-Ability Individuals in a Group Positively A¤ects the Demand
for Formal Education Regardless of own Ability
In this section, we test prediction (T2) that an individual who belongs to an ethnic group in which
the number of high-ability individuals is large is more likely to choose human capital over ethnic
capital, regardless of their own individual ability. We previously used parental education as one of
the proxies for child ability. In the same vein, we proxy the number of high-ability individuals in an
ethnic group by the proportion of adults (25 year old or older individuals) with at least a secondary
or university level education in that group. As our observation units are individuals aged 5-24 years,
using the education of those at least 25 years old to proxy for "group" ability guarantees a certain
15We observe that there are no Muslim Igbo in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd wealth quintiles. The fact that Muslim Igbo
belong only to the richest quintiles is evidence supporting the proposition that when a distinct group is small in size, its
members tend to do better than when they belong to a large group, perhaps knowing ab-initio that their own abilities
will determine whether they succeed or perish as they will have little or no signicant amount of the social capital which
plays a crucial role in determining outcomes in a patronage-based society like Nigeria.
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degree of exogeneity of our predictor. It also allows us to avoid the reection problem as children do
not inuence the educational choices of adults, it is rather the contrary.
We estimate the following equation:
Educir = GroupAbilityir1 +GroupAbility ir2 + abilityi3 +X + r + "ir (2)
whereGroupAbilityir is the ability of individual is ethnic group in neighborhood r; GroupAbility ir
is a vector of variables, each of which represents the ability of an ethnic group (to which i does not
belong) in neighborhood r; abilityi is the ability of individual i (proxied by parental education and
wealth); and X a range of other individual, household, and neighborhood characteristics. We estimate
equation (2) using the entire sample rst, and then the subsample representing each ethnic group.
Our rst set of results is presented in Table 5. We compute the neighborhood share of adults with
at least secondary school education in each ethnic group, and use the resulting variables to predict
individual education. In each Column (I), we control for seven dichotomous indicators for the year
2003 and for whether an ethnic group is represented in a neighborhood. In each Column (II), we
additionally control for parental education and wealth (which proxy child ability) and other relevant
factors as listed in Column (IV) of Table 2.
When estimates are based on the entire sample, we nd that the number of high-ability Igbo and
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri adult individuals increases childrens education in general, while the number of
high-ability Yoruba, Niger-Delta and Middle-Belt individuals has the opposite e¤ect when all controls
are included. We now restrict the analysis to each ethnic group. In general, the share of educated
adults in an ethnic group has its largest positive e¤ect on the education of children belonging to
that ethnic group, and in some cases has a negative e¤ect on other ethnic groups. For instance, a
one-point increase in the share of educated Yoruba adults increases the education of Yoruba children
by 1.7 years (Colum (I)) and that of Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children by 0.6 years, but has a negative
(but statistically insignicant) e¤ect on Igbo children. Similarly, a one-point increase in the share of
educated Igbo increases education among the Igbo children by 3 years (Column (I)), but decreases
education among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children by 2.2 years, and has no e¤ect on other ethnic
groups. Likewise, a one-point increase in the share of educated Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri adults increases
education by 5.2 years among Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri children, but has little e¤ect on other children.
When controls are introduced (Column (II)), these e¤ects diminish, but do not qualitatively change
the results.
The results do not change qualitatively if we proxy the number of high-ability individuals by
the share of adults with a university level education (Table 6). We still see a strong network e¤ect
according to which the proportion of high-ability individuals in a group positively a¤ects individual
education in that group.
In general, the ndings validate prediction (T2) of the model that an individual who belongs to
an ethnic group with a large number of high-ability individuals is more likely to choose human capital
over ethnic capital regardless of his own ability. Interestingly, we note that these e¤ects are mostly
conned within ethnic groups, as the proportion of high-ability individuals in a given ethnic group
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has little impact on children belonging to other ethnic groups in general. This clearly shows that the
e¤ect of group ability on an individuals investment in human capital works through within-group peer
e¤ects (or contagion). However, our goal was not to test peer e¤ects, as our theoretical prediction (T2)
does not involve peer e¤ects as a "primary" predictor of human capital investment, but it highlights
the role of group ability instead.
4.3.4 Group Size and Cross-Ethnic Di¤erences in Educational Attainment by Religion
In this section and the next two sections, we test prediction (T3) that being in a smaller ethnic group
increases the demand for human capital. We do this in three di¤erent ways. First, we estimate cross-
ethnic di¤erences in educational attainment (using equation 1) for Christians and Muslims separately.16
We expect individuals to perform better when their religion is less represented in their ethnic group.
In conducting this analysis, we also solve an interesting puzzle: if historically Christian communities
are pro-schooling and Islamic communities are anti-western schooling, shouldnt the Yoruba, who are
almost half Muslim, be doing worse than the predominantly Christian Igbo and Niger-Delta, or than
the Middle-Belt who are only 36% Muslim? We believe that the answer to this question is found in
the prediction of our model that small enough groups should do better than large groups (Proposition
2, Prediction (T3)), as members of small groups generate little network benets from ethnic capital,
and thus are better o¤ investing in human capital.
We therefore estimate the e¤ect of ethnicity on educational attainment for Christians and Muslims
separately. The results are presented in Table 7. We nd that, among Muslims, the Igbo and the
Niger-Delta perform better than the Yoruba; the latter are not signicantly di¤erent from the Middle-
Belt, but they do much better than the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. This result largely validates the theory,
as there are fewer Muslims among the Igbo (0.3%) and the Niger-Delta (2.4%) than among the Yoruba
(46%) and the Middle-Belt (31%), and the latter groups have a relatively smaller Muslim population
than do the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri (99%). When comparing Christians, we nd that the Yoruba
achieve better than the Igbo, the Niger-Delta and the Middle-Belt, but are not signicantly di¤erent
from the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri. These outcomes are again consistent with the theory.17 It follows
from these analyses that the overall advantage of Yoruba children over the Igbo, the Niger-Delta and
the Middle-Belt results from the advantage that the former have among Christians. Similarly, the
overall advantage of the Yoruba over the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri results from the advantage that the
former have among Muslims. Also, the Yoruba are clearly the religiously most fragmented ethnic
group, which, based on Proposition 5, sheds more light on their highest achievement.
16This test can also be conducted using a non-linear model where we regress education on ethnicity, religion and
interaction terms between ethnicity and religion, controlling for all other relevant variables. But the coe¢ cients on the
interaction terms will be a bit more di¢ cult to interpret.
17Note that although Christian communities have always been pro-schooling, a predominantly Christian ethnic group
is certainly more cohesive, which is likely to foster the formation of ethnic-based associations and organizations in which
members may invest a lot of their time. Such associations are known to abound in African societies, and their members
hold meetings regularly.
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4.3.5 Group Size and Cross-Religious Di¤erences in Educational Attainment by Eth-
nicity: When do Muslims Lag Behind?
The second way to test prediction (T3) is to compare Christians and Muslims in the entire sample
and in each ethnic group. We know from Table 2 that, overall, Christians have a higher educational
attainment than Muslims. However, based on prediction (T3), we expect this to be true only in ethnic
groups where Muslims represent a large share.
We estimate Christian-Muslim di¤erences in educational attainment in the overall sample, and
for each ethnic group using equation (1), but replacing ethnicity by a dummy indicator for whether
an individual is a Muslim. The ndings are presented in Table 8. We nd that Muslims lag behind
Christians by 1.2 years of education when no controls are added, and by 0.6 years when observable
characteristics, including neighborhood xed e¤ects, are controlled for. However, Christians enjoy
an advantage only among the Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri, the Yoruba, and the Middle-Belt, and Muslims
perform better among the Igbo and the Niger-Delta. Thus, Muslims lag behind only when they
constitute a fairly large population within a group, which is consistent with prediction (T3) of the
model.
4.3.6 Smaller Group Size and Ethnic Fragmentation have Positive E¤ects on Formal
Education Demand
The third way to test prediction (T3) that smaller ethnic groups invest more in education than their
counterparts in larger groups is to estimate the e¤ect of an individuals group size in a neighborhood
on his educational attainment. As we know, a corollary of (T3) is that local ethnic fragmentation
should have a positive e¤ect on the demand for education, which is prediction (T4). To test these two
predictions, we estimate the following equation:
Educirs = GroupSizeir1 + ELFr2 + ethnicityi3 +X + s + "irs (3)
where GroupSizeir is the size of individual is ethnic group in neighborhood r; ELFr is the
Hirschman-Herndahl index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation in neighborhood r18; and s is state xed
e¤ect.19 We also control for ethnicity, and all the child, household and neighborhood characteristics
included in Column (V) of Table 2. These variables are included incrementally.
To test (T3), we rst compute the share of each individuals ethnic group in the neighborhood
in which he resides. A low value therefore indicates a¢ liation with a small ethnic group. We then
regress education on the resulting variable, controlling for all other relevant variables. The ndings are
presented in Table 9. A one-point increase in the relative size of an individuals ethnic group decreases
his educational attainment by 1.5 years if other variables are not controlled for (Column (I)), by 1.2
18Let P = fE1; :::; ECg be the collection of ethnic groups in a neighborhood r. Denoting the size of an ethnic group
Ec by nc, the Hirschman-Herndahl index of ethnic fragmentation for that neighborhood is given by:
ELFr = 1 P1cC n2c(n1+:::+nC)2
19Nigeria has 36 states, and each state can be viewed as a collection of neighborhoods. We control for state xed
e¤ects (instead of neighborhood xed e¤ects as in the previous regressions) because ELFr varies at the neighborhood
level, and so controlling for neighborhood xed e¤ects would not allow us to estimate its e¤ect.
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years if we control for ethnicity (Column (II)), and by 0.2 years if we further control for all child and
household characteristics (Column (III)) and state xed e¤ects (Column (IV)). All these e¤ects are
statistically signicant at the 1% level, clearly validating (T3).
Finally, we test prediction (T4) that local ethnic fragmentation should have a positive e¤ect on
the demand for education. In Columns (V)-(VIII), we replicate the analysis in Columns (I)-(IV), now
replacing the relative size of ones ethnic group by the usual index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
computed at the neighborhood level. We nd that a one-point increase in that index increases indi-
vidual education by 2.3 years when no other control is included (Column (V)), and by 0.5 years when
controls are included (Column (VIII)). These e¤ects are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Importantly, in Column (IX), we simultaneously control for the neighborhood share of ones ethnic
group and ethnic fragmentation, along with all the other variables in Columns (IV) and (VIII). We
now nd that only ethnic fragmentation has a statistically signicant e¤ect, which simply implies,
consistent with the theory, that the fact that ethnic fragmentation has a positive e¤ect on the demand
for education in Columns (V)-(VIII) is a corollary of the positive e¤ect that being in a smaller group
has on this outcome.
5 Conclusion
We study the e¤ect of communitarianism the tendency of people to organize into separate culturally
homogeneous communities which act as closed networks on individual and group inequality in human
capital investment. Ethnic groups are exogenous in our analysis, but adherence to group values is
endogenous, as is the decision to invest in human capital. We uncover important individual- and
group-level determinants of educational attainment. An individuals demand for human capital is
a¤ected positively by his ability and his groups ability, and negatively by his groups size. The
ndings also imply that even if the distribution of ability is identical across all ethnic groups, these
groups may still di¤er in average educational attainment, with divergence only occurring among their
low-ability members, as high-ability individuals always invest in human capital. Moreover, the results
show that ethnic and group fragmentation increases the "demand" for human capital. The mechanism
is that fragmentation leads to smaller groups, and members of small groups invest more in human
capital as they generate little benets from ethnic capital.
We validate all these predictions of the model using nationally representative household data
from Nigeria where tribal a¢ liation and religion are the primary sources of cultural identication.
In particular, we document huge cross-ethnic and religious di¤erences in educational attainment,
and explain these di¤erences by the fact that low-ability members of historically Muslim groups (i.e.
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri) choose Koranic education as an alternative to formal education. These ndings
also demonstrate the long-lasting impacts of di¤erential historical exposure to Christianity and Islam
on contemporary di¤erences in educational attainment between ethnic groups in Nigeria. We do not
argue that children in the worst-o¤ groups are intrinsically of lower ability as compared to other
children. We believe that such a claim would probably be wrong and completely misleading. In
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theory, identical groups might achieve di¤erent outcomes, with the di¤erences occurring only among
their low-ability members, as we also show empirically. Furthermore, we document empirically the
positive e¤ect of ethnic fragmentation on the demand for schooling.
The positive e¤ect of group fragmentation on the demand for human capital explains the highest
success of the Yoruba, the most religiously fragmented group. The outcomes for Yoruba Muslims also
o¤er a compelling illustration of the fact that an individual may belong to a social group without
necessarily adhering to its core values when these are in opposition to mainstream values. Indeed,
despite being 46% Muslim, only 0.4% of the Yoruba attend exclusively Koranic schools. In general, we
emprically validate the theoretical prediction that members of smaller groups invest more in human
capital. This also explains why despite the fact that Muslims lag behind Christians in general, their
disadvantage is only apparent in ethnic groups in which they represent a fairly large share.
Our theoretical ndings also answer a puzzle raised by John Ogbu (1978) who, reecting on the
educational attainment of African Americans, sought to understand why groups of people of the same
ancestry but located in di¤erent regions or countries demonstrated di¤erent educational achievement.
He argued that Black Americans could be partitioned into "voluntary minorities" and "involuntary
minorities" (descendants of Blacks who came to the United States through slavery), and that the latter
tended to adopt an oppositional attitude towards mainstream culture, including formal education. No
such partition of minorities can be achieved in most countries. Yet, our ndings show that members
of the same ethnic group who are located in di¤erent regions of a country are likely to di¤er with
respect to how they accumulate human capital, simply because smaller subgroups perform better than
larger subgroups. This may explain why second and subsequent generation migrants whose parents
have left their region of origin to settle in another region within a country generally do better than
their co-ethnics who remain in their homeland. This will be the case even if the distribution of ability
does not di¤er across the group that left and the one that did not.
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A Appendix: Proof of Propositions
 Proof. of Proposition 1
P1. If the individual is the only member of his group, his utility from investing completely in
human capital will be:
Ui = 1  1 + 1  ai + 0 = 1 + ai;
whereas his his utility from investing completely in ethnic capital will be:
Ui = 0 + 0  ai + 1  1 = 1
Since ai > 1, he is always better o¤ being invested in human capital.
P2. Rewriting the utility function in terms of the investment in human capital, we get:
Ui =
 X
i2Ec
khi + ai
!
 khi +
 
nc  
X
i2Ec
khi
!
(1  khi ):
Di¤erentiating the utility function, we get:
@Ui
@khi
= Ehc + k
h
i + ai   (nc   Ehc )  (1  khi )
= Ehc + ai   (nc   Ehc ) + khi   (1  khi ):
Clearly, if Ehc  Eec , then Ehc  nc Ehc , which implies that the above derivative is positive since
ai > 1.
P3. If Ehc  Eec , using the results from the previous property, we know that @Ui@khi > 0 if and only
if ai is high enough, or if ai > (nc   Ehc )  Ehc + (1  khi )  khi .
P4. Di¤erentiating, we have:
@Ui
@Ehc
= khi   (1  khi );
which is always positive if khi  1=2.
P5. Di¤erentiating, we get:
@Ui
@ai
= khi ;
which is positive as long as the individual invests a positive amount in human capital.
The proofs of Propositions (2)-(4) are deduced from the following series of lemmas. The rst lemma
shows that individuals will invest fully in either form of capital, in other words, there will be no partial
investments. Intuitively, suppose that the ethnic community of individual i is more invested in one
form of capital, then we know that as he keeps transferring his investment to this form of capital,
his utility grows. This individual will then compare the benets from fully investing in ethnic capital
versus fully investing in human capital. Lemma 2 shows that for any community size and for any
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distribution of ability, there exists some ability threshold such that an individual whose ability level is
above the threshold always invests in human capital regardless of the actions of the other members of
his ethnic group. Lemma 3 shows that ethnic groups that are su¢ ciently small have all their members
investing in human capital. Lemma 4 shows that in a large enough community, low-ability individuals
choose to invest in the same form of capital if they are numerous.
Lemma 1 In a Nash equilirbium, all individuals will choose to invest fully in either human or ethnic
capital.
Proof. This follows from (P2) - (P3). Suppose we have a community Ec and an individual
i 2 Ec. First suppose that Ehc  Eec and khi < 1. From assumption (P2), we know that if individual i
were to deviate to khi + , he would be strictly better o¤. Since, this is true for any level of k
h
i 2 [0; 1],
we deduce that he will choose to fully invest in human capital.
Now suppose that Ehc  Eec . In this case, we know from (P3) that utility is lowest when investment
in ethnic capital is k. Hence, the optimal investment in ethnic capital is either 0 or 1.
Lemma 2 In a Nash equilirbium, for each ethnic community Ec, there exists some ability level ac
such that any member i with ability ai > ac chooses to invest only in human capital.
Proof. We know from (P3) and (P5) that as an individuals ability increases, he benets more
from investing in human capital. Suppose that all the other members of the community invest in
ethnic capital, then we know that there will be some ability threshold, say ac1, such that members
with ability above ac1 will choose to invest only in human capital. In other words, that ac1 is such
that:
U(1; Ec   1; 1; ac1)  U(0; Ec; 0; ac1),
with the inequality being strict for ability levels greater than ac1. To be precise, suppose that the
ability distribution in the community is fa1; ::; acg. Then, we can partition the community as follows
Ec = fEc(a1); ::; Ec(ac)g where Ec(al) (l = 1; :::; c) is the set of members with ability level equal to al.
Moreover, if ac1  ac, then there might exist another equilibrium where all individuals with ability
greater than ac2 and lower than ac1 such that
P
yc2 Ec(ay) <
P
x<c2
Ec(ax) choose to invest in human
capital if the following holds:
U(
X
yc2
Ec(ay);
X
x<c2
Ec(ax); 1; ax  ac2)  U(
X
yc2
Ec(ay)  1;
X
x<c2
Ec(ax) + 1; 0; ax  ac2)
and
U(
X
yc2
Ec(ay);
X
x<c2
Ec(ax); 0; ax < ac2)  U(
X
yc2
Ec(ay) + 1;
X
x<c2
Ec(ax)  1; 1; ax < ac2)
Lemma 3 In a Nash equilirbium, there exists a threhold size E such that in any ethnic community
with size below E, each individual chooses to fully invest in human capital regardless of his ability.
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Proof. This follows mainly from (P1), from which we know that in a single member community,
the individual is better o¤ choosing investment in human capital than in ethnic capital. E is greater
than or equal to 1. Now suppose that we increase the size of the community. Using (P4), we know
that if the rest of community invests in ethnic capital, but the individual invests in human capital,
his utility will fall below the level of utility he would generates if he were the only member of the
community. Similarly, using (P4), we know that if the rest of community invests in ethnic capital,
and the individual invests in ethnic capital too, his utility will increase above the utility level he would
generate if he were the only member of the community. In short, the threshold size E we are looking
for solves:
U(1; E   1; 1; 0)  U(0; E; 0; 0):
E is such that if the size of a community is smaller than E, even a lowest-ability member of that
community will not nd it benecial to invest in ethnic capital even if all the other members of the
community invest in ethnic capital.
Lemma 4 In a Nash equilirbium, for any ethnic community Ec with size Ec > E, all members who
have ability higher than ac choose to invest in human capital. Further, all members who have ability
lower than ac choose to invest in the same form of capital.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, we know that all individuals will fully invest in either one of the capitals.
We also know that if a larger number of individuals (besides an individual i) invest in one type of
capital, it follows from (P2) and (P3) that individual i, if he has ability lower than ac , will also prefer
to invest in that form of capital.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Under the assumption that the probability of the realization of each of the two equilibria
of large groups is the same across these groups, the proof follows immediately from Proposition 2.
36
 37 
 
Figure 1: Average years of formal education acquired by age and religion 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Nigeria’s Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Christians and Muslims across ethnic groups in Nigeria, 5-24 year olds 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Figure 3: Share of individuals 5-24 years old with only Koranic education by ethnicity 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1993 Nigeria Migration Survey (NISER (1997)) 
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Figure 4: Average years of formal education acquired by age and ethnicity 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the 1999 and 2003 Demographic and Health Surveys 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 All Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta Middle-Belt Hausa/Fulani/ 
Kanuri 
Other ethnicity 
Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Ethnic groups               
Yoruba 0.156 0.362 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Igbo 0.157 0.364 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Niger-Delta 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Middle-Belt 0.084 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 0.281 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other ethnicity 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Religion               
Christian 0.516 0.500 0.529 0.499 0.953 0.212 0.942 0.234 0.674 0.469 0.005 0.070 0.590 0.492 
Muslim 0.465 0.499 0.463 0.499 0.003 0.054 0.026 0.159 0.307 0.461 0.992 0.092 0.390 0.488 
Other religion 0.019 0.135 0.008 0.090 0.044 0.206 0.032 0.176 0.019 0.138 0.004 0.060 0.020 0.141 
Child characteristics               
Male 0.488 0.500 0.506 0.500 0.476 0.499 0.505 0.500 0.485 0.500 0.476 0.499 0.492 0.500 
Age 13.130 5.592 13.492 5.581 13.653 5.530 13.666 5.493 13.048 5.613 12.479 5.589 13.113 5.599 
Biological child of household 
head (HH) 
0.734 0.442 0.762 0.426 0.732 0.443 0.748 0.434 0.749 0.434 0.702 0.457 0.745 0.436 
Household characteristics               
HH is male 0.862 0.345 0.825 0.380 0.747 0.435 0.767 0.423 0.874 0.332 0.958 0.201 0.888 0.316 
HH’s age 47.527 13.769 50.536 14.245 48.833 13.070 48.272 13.897 48.027 14.295 44.599 13.021 47.666 13.895 
HH has no education 0.373 0.484 0.284 0.451 0.218 0.413 0.156 0.363 0.308 0.462 0.617 0.486 0.360 0.480 
HH has Primary education 0.284 0.451 0.261 0.439 0.391 0.488 0.356 0.479 0.313 0.464 0.200 0.400 0.289 0.453 
HH has Secondary education 0.212 0.409 0.277 0.448 0.264 0.441 0.331 0.471 0.215 0.411 0.110 0.313 0.202 0.402 
HH has University education 0.123 0.329 0.168 0.373 0.119 0.323 0.147 0.354 0.154 0.361 0.071 0.256 0.140 0.347 
Urban place of residence 0.359 0.480 0.573 0.495 0.410 0.492 0.248 0.432 0.267 0.443 0.324 0.468 0.302 0.459 
Wealth -0.002 1.855 0.970 1.754 0.534 1.862 0.478 1.787 0.021 1.685 -0.684 1.709 -0.432 1.709 
Year 1999 0.529 0.499 0.639 0.480 0.515 0.500 0.646 0.478 0.483 0.500 0.449 0.497 0.529 0.499 
Year 2003 0.471 0.499 0.361 0.480 0.485 0.500 0.354 0.478 0.517 0.500 0.551 0.497 0.471 0.499 
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Table 2:  OLS, state and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of ethnicity on number of years of formal 
education among 5-24 year old individuals 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Igbo -0.487 -0.489 -0.667 -0.267 -0.122 
(0.079)** (0.058)** (0.057)** (0.099)** (0.119) 
Niger-Delta -0.419 -0.497 -0.673 -0.286 -0.158 
(0.088)** (0.065)** (0.063)** (0.101)** (0.134) 
Middle-Belt -1.81 -1.519 -1.05 -0.769 -0.653 
(0.094)** (0.069)** (0.064)** (0.096)** (0.139)** 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -4.049 -3.399 -1.626 -1.307 -0.963 
(0.070)** (0.051)** (0.055)** (0.097)** (0.121)** 
Other ethnicity -1.869 -1.622 -0.847 -0.454 -0.48 
(0.073)** (0.053)** (0.051)** (0.082)** (0.104)** 
Child age 0.713 0.65 0.645 0.642 
(0.016)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
(Chid age)^2 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Biological child of household head (HH) 1.273 1.17 1.147 1.147 
(0.039)** (0.039)** (0.039)** (0.039)** 
Child is male 0.423 0.386 0.391 0.386 
(0.033)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.029)** 
Year 2003 0.04 0.021 0.011 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age of HH 0.045 0.044 0.035 
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
(Age of HH)^2 0 0 0 
(0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) 
HH is male -0.972 -0.919 -0.775 
(0.046)** (0.046)** (0.048)** 
Muslim -0.8 -0.797 -0.544 
(0.044)** (0.048)** (0.060)** 
HH has primary education 0.571 0.529 0.345 
(0.040)** (0.041)** (0.042)** 
HH has secondary education 1.186 1.082 0.835 
(0.049)** (0.050)** (0.052)** 
HH has university education 1.662 1.62 1.317 
(0.059)** (0.059)** (0.062)** 
Urban 0.171 0.22 
(0.036)** (0.038)** 
Wealth 0.373 0.331 0.242 
(0.011)** (0.011)** (0.014)** 
State fixed effect (FE) NO NO NO YES 
Neighbordhood fixed effect (FE) NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 
R-squared 0.137 0.539 0.615 0.613 0.602 
Standard errors in parentheses. In Column (V), Year 2003, Urban and State dummies are removed after 
neighborhood fixed effects are included because neighborhoods (or census tracts) sampled in 1999 are distinct 
from those sampled in 2003; similarly, in each year, no neighborhood simultaneously belongs to the urban area 
and to the rural area or to two states. Therefore, controlling for neighborhood fixed effects subsumes or entirely 
controls for each of the removed variables.  
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 3: OLS, state and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by child age group 
 Panel A: 5-9 years old Panel B: 10-14 years old 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Igbo -0.532 -0.557 -0.557 -0.23 -0.137 -0.897 -0.915 -1.137 -0.6 -0.316 
 (0.046)** (0.040)** (0.042)** (0.073)** (0.093) (0.097)** (0.090)** (0.089)** (0.154)** (0.197) 
Niger-Delta -0.395 -0.412 -0.425 -0.178 -0.071 -0.796 -0.81 -1.014 -0.697 -0.402 
 (0.052)** (0.045)** (0.047)** (0.076)* (0.106) (0.109)** (0.101)** (0.098)** (0.160)** (0.221) 
Middle-Belt -0.628 -0.607 -0.49 -0.279 -0.166 -1.587 -1.635 -1.41 -1.107 -0.795 
 (0.053)** (0.046)** (0.046)** (0.069)** (0.101) (0.117)** (0.108)** (0.100)** (0.150)** (0.227)** 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -1.052 -0.966 -0.616 -0.476 -0.434 -3.364 -3.273 -2.006 -1.649 -1.006 
 (0.039)** (0.034)** (0.039)** (0.069)** (0.089)** (0.088)** (0.081)** (0.086)** (0.151)** (0.194)** 
Other ethnicity -0.659 -0.648 -0.454 -0.29 -0.289 -1.841 -1.812 -1.274 -0.894 -0.749 
 (0.041)** (0.036)** (0.037)** (0.060)** (0.078)** (0.091)** (0.084)** (0.079)** (0.128)** (0.172)** 
Observations 10384 10384 10384 10384 10384 7947 7947 7947 7947 7947 
R-squared 0.086 0.313 0.35 0.302 0.275 0.203 0.321 0.441 0.307 0.228 
 Panel C: 15-19 years old Panel D: 20-24 years old 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Igbo -0.377 -0.391 -0.696 -0.274 -0.46 -0.159 -0.055 -0.279 -0.172 -0.415 
 (0.139)** (0.133)** (0.125)** -0.218 (0.262) (0.2) (0.191) (0.17) (0.289) (0.353) 
Niger-Delta -0.442 -0.416 -0.746 -0.336 -0.505 -0.462 -0.549 -0.739 -0.295 -0.187 
 (0.154)** (0.148)** (0.137)** -0.213 (0.286) (0.226)* (0.216)* (0.191)** (0.3) (0.406) 
Middle-Belt -1.684 -1.67 -1.167 -0.867 -0.418 -2.715 -2.363 -1.227 -0.851 -1.387 
 (0.177)** (0.169)** (0.149)** (0.217)** (0.322) (0.242)** (0.232)** (0.196)** (0.292)** (0.421)** 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -5.534 -5.124 -2.578 -2.158 -1.24 -6.62 -5.871 -2.472 -1.884 -1.74 
 (0.130)** (0.126)** (0.130)** (0.223)** (0.287)** (0.181)** (0.177)** (0.173)** (0.294)** (0.366)** 
Other ethnicity -2.153 -2.074 -1.106 -0.496 -0.836 -2.387 -2.191 -0.836 -0.137 -0.473 
 (0.133)** (0.127)** (0.114)** (0.183)** (0.238)** (0.186)** (0.178)** (0.153)** -0.245 (0.312) 
Observation 6909 6909 6909 6909 6909 5506 5506 5506 5506 5506 
R-Squared 0.279 0.341 0.503 0.311 0.165 0.276 0.338 0.547 0.371 0.188 
Controls NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO YES  NO NO NO YES  
Neighborhood FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include child (Column (II)) and household (Columns (III)-(V)) characteristics as in Table 2.                                                 
*significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 4: OLS, state and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by parental SES (or child 
ability) 
 Panel A: Analysis restricted to children whose household head 
has: 
Panel B: Analysis restricted to Muslim children whose 
household head has: 
 Any or no 
education 
No 
education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
University 
education 
Any or no 
education 
No 
education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
University 
education 
Igbo -0.122 -1.577 -0.545 0.252 -0.155 0.99 5.984 0.138 -0.354 3.162 
 (0.119) (0.441)** (0.244)* (0.197) (0.25) (0.942) (2.415)* (2.464) (1.833) (2.163) 
Niger-Delta -0.158 -0.36 -0.161 0.041 0.018 1.489 0.491 -0.219 2.362 0.057 
 (0.134) (0.406) (0.274) (0.219) (0.303) (0.537)** (0.788) (1.285) (1.445) (3.429) 
Middle-Belt -0.653 -1.454 -0.417 -0.507 -0.923 -0.482 -1.389 0.095 -0.766 0.094 
 (0.139)** (0.351)** (0.261) (0.268) (0.300)** (0.294) (0.551)* (0.761) (0.88) (0.933) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -0.963 -1.659 -0.521 -1.244 -0.365 -0.724 -1.512 -0.424 -0.578 0.579 
 (0.121)** (0.292)** (0.255)* (0.259)** (0.296) (0.228)** (0.451)** (0.509) (0.610) (0.808) 
Other ethnicity -0.48 -1.358 -0.49 -0.053 -0.555 -0.42 -1.235 -0.503 0.709 -0.012 
 (0.104)** (0.278)** (0.203)* (0.191) (0.243)* (0.228) (0.444)** (0.491) (0.636) (0.844) 
Observations 30746 11474 8741 6525 3793 14304 7867 3158 2017 1194 
R-squared 0.518 0.345 0.59 0.669 0.727 0.346 0.245 0.412 0.512 0.577 
 Panel C: Analysis restricted to children whose households fall 
into the following wealth quintile 
Panel D: Analysis restricted to Muslim children whose 
households fall into the following wealth quintile 
 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Igbo -1.84 -1.179 0.463 0.015 -0.137    1.442 1.185 
 (0.498)** (0.727) (0.444) (0.242) (0.154)    (2.171) (1.337) 
Niger-Delta -0.767 -0.81 -0.18 -0.255 0.105 -1.621 0.325 -0.932 0.509 2.582 
 (0.469) (0.516) (0.463) (0.273) (0.185) (0.998) (1.461) (2.234) (1.191) (1.451) 
Middle-Belt -1.098 -1.126 -0.05 -0.781 -0.293 -2.785 0.71 0.318 -1.108 0.112 
 (0.562) (0.521)* (0.441) (0.273)** (0.211) (0.940)** (1.019) (0.913) (0.636) (0.645) 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -1.621 -1.321 -0.923 -0.989 -0.696 -3.114 -0.73 -0.761 -1.002 -0.787 
 (0.406)** (0.435)** (0.399)* (0.246)** (0.195)** (0.635)** (0.760) (0.782) (0.512) (0.413) 
Other ethnicity -1.221 -0.891 0.147 -0.43 -0.525 -2.911 -0.236 0.191 -0.389 -1.126 
 (0.383)** (0.388)* (0.341) (0.209)* (0.160)** (0.631)** (0.727) (0.746) (0.517) (0.455)* 
Observation 7717 4278 5910 6610 6231 4611 2224 2596 2769 2104 
R-Squared 0.301 0.444 0.507 0.64 0.73 0.152 0.291 0.327 0.509 0.613 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include child and household characteristics as in Column (V) of Table 2.                                                                               
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 5: OLS and fixed effect estimates of the effects of the neighborhood-level proportion of adults with at least a secondary level education on years of 
formal education by ethnic group, children 5-24 years old 
  Analysis is restricted to children belonging to the following ethnic group: 
  Any ethnic group Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta Middle-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri Other ethnicity 
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
% sec+ Yoruba -0.015 -0.065 1.697 0.312 -0.946 -0.515 0.34 0.175 -0.044 0.398 0.561 0.581 0.479 0.019 
(0.122) (0.089) (0.261)** (0.185) (0.582) (0.333) (0.652) (0.475) (0.602) (0.472) (0.197)** (0.174)** (0.282) (0.209) 
% sec+ Igbo 0.359 0.391 0.109 0.034 3.004 0.736 0.298 0.562 -0.356 0.52 -2.246 -1.199 0.04 0.323 
(0.109)** (0.083)** (0.319) (0.178) (0.241)** (0.173)** (0.338) (0.194)** (0.335) (0.290) (0.430)** (0.390)** (0.296) (0.222) 
% sec+ Niger-Delta 0.413 -0.262 0.877 0.206 -0.266 -0.237 0.838 0.33 0.336 -1.577 -0.015 -0.153 -0.195 -0.568 
(0.130)** (0.097)** (0.279)** (0.169) (0.362) (0.215) (0.356)* (0.248) (0.740) (0.644)* (0.394) (0.350) (0.264) (0.214)** 
% sec+ Middle-Belt 0.418 -0.067 0.036 -0.015 -0.627 -0.283 0.44 -0.631 0.592 0.361 0.2 -0.049 -0.632 -0.227 
(0.129)** (0.093) (0.311) (0.173) (0.563) (0.337) (0.691) (0.476) (0.411) (0.343) (0.210) (0.185) (0.290)* (0.218) 
% sec+ Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 2.797 0.788 0.381 -0.115 1.075 0.349 -0.566 -0.083 0.677 0.904 5.187 1.607 0.412 0.182 
(0.130)** (0.096)** (0.428) (0.251) (0.551) (0.310) (0.780) (0.488) (0.433) (0.322)** (0.184)** (0.204)** (0.255) (0.189) 
% sec+ Other ethnicity 1.289 0.436 0.414 0.113 1.225 0.372 0.594 0.355 -0.336 -0.353 0.69 0.417 3.834 1.069 
(0.079)** (0.057)** (0.224) (0.122) (0.275)** (0.153)* (0.205)** (0.122)** (0.302) (0.229) (0.127)** (0.114)** (0.204)** (0.181)** 
Observations 30746 30746 4782 4782 4836 4836 3144 3144 2587 2587 8639 8639 6758 6758 
R-squared 0.164 0.556 0.037 0.725 0.064 0.742 0.039 0.715 0.064 0.565 0.157 0.368 0.112 0.559 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. % sec+ Yoruba, e.g., is the neighborhood level proportion of Yoruba aged 25 or older with at least a secondary level 
education. For each subsample, Column (I) includes 7 dummy indicators for the year 2003 and the presence of each ethnic group in a neighborhood; Column 
(II) additionally includes child and household characteristics as in Column (IV) of Table 2.                                                                                                                                             
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 6: OLS and fixed effect estimates of the effects of the neighborhood-level proportion of adults with a university level education on years of formal 
education by ethnic group, children 5-24 years old 
  Analysis is restricted to children belonging to the following ethnic group: 
  Any ethnic group Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta Middle-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri Other ethnicity 
(I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
% univ. Yoruba 0.017 -0.033 2.478 -0.132 0.069 0.275 -0.08 -0.523 -0.501 -0.175 0.385 0.701 0.416 -0.296 
(0.117) (0.088) (0.356)** (0.249) (0.442) (0.256) (0.385) (0.297) (0.427) (0.409) (0.261) (0.223)** (0.264) (0.205) 
% univ. Igbo 0.704 0.105 0.416 0.128 3.257 0.617 0.421 1.099 -0.322 0.635 -1.69 -0.263 -0.101 -0.371 
(0.142)** (0.100) (0.347) (0.193) (0.377)** (0.249)* (0.523) (0.333)** (0.686) (0.540) (0.284)** (0.244) (0.311) (0.225) 
% univ. Niger-Delta -0.165 -0.384 0.425 0.198 -1.432 -0.402 2.515 0.838 -1.493 -1.889 -1.27 -1.436 -0.205 -0.261 
(0.152) (0.109)** (0.311) (0.174) (0.377)** (0.208) (0.525)** (0.352)* (0.979) (0.866)* (0.563)* (0.533)** (0.309) (0.242) 
% univ. Middle-Belt 0.306 0.104 -0.312 0.152 -0.493 -0.185 0.496 0.247 1.51 0.965 0.178 0.107 -1.06 -0.327 
(0.139)* (0.099) (0.380) (0.220) (0.504) (0.299) (0.664) (0.489) (0.440)** (0.419)* (0.208) (0.187) (0.335)** (0.246) 
% univ. Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 2.324 0.622 0.5 0.212 1.118 0.513 -0.131 -0.01 0.561 1.516 7.145 1.767 -0.427 -0.68 
(0.199)** (0.140)** (0.819) (0.501) (0.751) (0.412) (0.916) (0.540) (0.734) (0.622)* (0.323)** (0.323)** (0.332) (0.241)** 
% univ. Other ethnicity 1.369 0.521 -0.24 0.04 0.696 0.25 1.024 0.252 -0.86 -0.139 0.996 0.778 4.714 1.415 
(0.107)** (0.075)** (0.394) (0.222) (0.364) (0.204) (0.240)** (0.141) (0.288)** (0.226) (0.201)** (0.177)** (0.285)** (0.239)** 
Observations 30746 30746 4782 4782 4836 4836 3144 3144 2587 2587 8639 8639 6758 6758 
R-squared 0.152 0.555 0.036 0.725 0.044 0.741 0.045 0.714 0.068 0.564 0.127 0.367 0.099 0.559 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. % univ. Yoruba, e.g., is the neighborhood level proportion of Yoruba aged 25 or older with a university level education. For 
each subsample, Column (I) includes 7 dummy indicators for the year 2003 and the presence of each ethnic group in a neighborhood; Column (II) additionally 
includes child and household characteristics as in Column (IV) of Table 2.                                                                                                                                                                       
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 7: OLS and neighborhood fixed effect estimates of ethnicity on number of years of formal education by religion 
Muslims Christians 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Igbo 0.853 0.99 -0.436 -0.272 
(1.162) (0.942) (0.214)* (0.118)* 
Niger-Delta 1.495 1.489 -0.313 -0.296 
(0.661)* (0.537)** (0.239) (0.132)* 
Middle-Belt -0.608 -0.482 -1.115 -0.703 
(0.363) (0.294) (0.282)** (0.156)**
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -1.234 -0.724 -0.493 -0.73 
(0.280)** (0.228)** (0.992) (0.547) 
Other ethnicity -0.79 -0.42 -0.512 -0.436 
(0.280)** (0.228) (0.211)* (0.116)**
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Neighborhood FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 14304 14304 15869 15869 
R-squared 0.003 0.346 0.001 0.696 
Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include child and household characteristics as in Column (V) of Table 2.                            
*significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level                                          
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Table 8: Cross-religious differences in years of formal education within each ethnic group 
All sample Yoruba Igbo Niger-Delta Middle-Belt Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) 
Muslim -1.203 -0.583 -0.753 -0.271 -0.218 0.825 -0.062 0.543 -0.236 -0.162 -1.019 -0.624 
(0.083)** (0.062)** (0.149)** (0.082)** (1.183) (0.603) (0.753) (0.406) (0.287) (0.196) (0.492)* (0.421) 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Neighborhood  FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 30173 30173 4743 4743 4621 4621 3043 3043 2537 2537 8608 8608 
R-squared 0.007 0.52 0.006 0.716 0 0.742 0 0.712 0 0.55 0.001 0.27 
 Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include child characteristics and household characteristics as in Column (V) of Table 2.                                                      
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 9: OLS and fixed effect estimates of the effects of ethnic group size and ethnic heterogeneity on years of formal education   
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
Neighborhood % of own ethnic group -1.543 -1.278 -0.209 -0.227 -0.046 
(0.090)** (0.085)** (0.060)** (0.067)** (0.097) 
Neighborhood ethnic heterogeneity index 2.304 2.098 0.314 0.458 0.503 
(0.111)** (0.104)** (0.076)** (0.089)** (0.130)** 
Igbo -0.494 -0.678 -0.351 -0.361 -0.661 -0.334 -0.326 
(0.079)** (0.057)** (0.102)** (0.079)** (0.057)** (0.099)** (0.102)** 
Niger-Delta -0.453 -0.691 -0.342 -0.404 -0.688 -0.333 -0.326 
(0.088)** (0.063)** (0.102)** (0.088)** (0.063)** (0.101)** (0.102)** 
Middle-Belt 
-1.874 -1.072 -0.812 -1.836 -1.071 -0.805 -0.8 
 
(0.094)** (0.065)** (0.097)** (0.094)** (0.065)** (0.096)** (0.097)** 
 
Hausa/Fulani/Kanuri -4.014 -1.629 -1.338 -3.962 -1.63 -1.349 -1.347  
(0.070)** (0.055)** (0.097)** (0.070)** (0.055)** (0.097)** (0.097)** 
Other ethnicity -1.994 -0.881 -0.504 -1.946 -0.879 -0.492 -0.486 
(0.073)** (0.052)** (0.083)** (0.073)** (0.051)** (0.082)** (0.084)** 
Observations 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 30746 
R-squared 0.01 0.143 0.615 0.614 0.014 0.148 0.615 0.614 0.614 
Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include child characteristics and household characteristics as in Column (IV) of Table 2.                                                      
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level       
